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I. INTRODUCTION 
A “D-” is not the grade anyone wishes to receive; yet, it is the grade 
that the Institute for Justice1 (“IJ”) awarded Kansas for its civil asset 
forfeiture statutes.2  In a national survey of forfeiture approaches, the IJ 
assigned each jurisdiction an overall system grade based on the 
jurisdiction’s individual grades in three categories: “the financial incentive 
for law enforcement to seize, the government’s standard of proof to forfeit, 
and who bears the burden in innocent owner claims.”3  If Kansas’ low 
grade does not demonstrate that there are problems with Kansas’ civil 
forfeiture system, consider the American Civil Liberties Union’s 
(“ACLU”) determination that the Kansas civil asset forfeiture laws are 
“among the worst in the nation.”4  Kansas’ civil forfeiture laws are known 
collectively as the Kansas Standard Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Act 
(“KSASFA”).5  Kansas’ forfeiture problems begin with its use of a civil 
forfeiture approach. 
Civil asset forfeiture is a civil action in which the government pursues 
forfeiture, of real or personal property, based on the fictional idea that the 
property itself committed a wrong.6  Civil forfeiture actions proceed 
                                                        
*  J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Kansas School of Law; B.A. & B.C.J., 2015, New Mexico State 
University.  I would like to thank the staff and editors of the Kansas Law Review for their assistance 
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 1.   The Institute for Justice is a national law firm that focuses on economic liberty, property 
rights, educational choice, and free speech.  About Us, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/about-us/ (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2018).  
 2.   DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL 
ASSET FORFEITURE 22 (2nd ed. 2015), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-
2nd-edition.pdf.  
 3.   Id. 
 4.   DeAnn Smith, Audit in Kansas Proves Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws Need Reform, ACLU 
KAN. (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.aclukansas.org/en/press-releases/audit-kansas-proves-civil-asset-
forfeiture-laws-need-reform. 
 5.   KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-4104–60-4126 (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
 6.   Charles Basler, Note, Reforming Civil Asset Forfeiture: Ensuring Fairness and Due Process 
for Property Owners in Massachusetts, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 665, 668–69 (2015). 
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against the property alone, not the owners.7  As such, the action proceeds 
under in rem jurisdiction.8  Kansas, like many other jurisdictions, uses its 
civil asset forfeiture statutes for the governmental purpose of ensuring that 
illegal activity is not profitable.9  However, in pursuing this purpose, 
Kansas disregards a property owner’s constitutional rights and allows for 
substantial governmental abuse and overreach. 
Under the U.S. Constitution, a person is entitled to certain protections 
from the government in regard to his property.  People are “to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures,”10 and no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”11  These provisions, found in 
the Bill of Rights, are applicable to the states by incorporation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause: “nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”12  While these Amendments seem to imply that a property owner is 
entitled to constitutional protections when the government seizes his 
property, these protections are actually inapplicable to civil asset forfeiture 
cases.13 
The Kansas Legislature must reform KSASFA from a civil forfeiture 
system to a criminal forfeiture system to better effectuate its purpose, to 
protect individuals’ property rights, and to curb governmental overreach 
and abuse.  Part II of this Comment examines the history of civil asset 
forfeiture and three different approaches to forfeiture.  Part III will then 
focus on the problems caused by KSASFA’s current form and will propose 
necessary reforms that address these problems. 
II. BACKGROUND 
An examination of the history of civil forfeiture and of the different 
forfeiture approaches taken by other jurisdictions will clarify how 
KSASFA falls short of other forfeiture systems.  Part A of this section 
                                                        
 7.   Marcel Krzystek, Article, The Recent Congressional Reform of Federal Civil Forfeitures, 9 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 669, 670 (2000). 
 8.   Id. 
 9.   KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-4104–60-4126; State v. Yeoman, 951 P.2d 964, 966 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1997). 
 10.   U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 11.   U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 12.   U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 13.   Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic 
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 47–50 (1998).  
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examines civil asset forfeiture’s evolution from its inception to its current 
use.  Part B describes Kansas’ civil asset forfeiture system and compares 
it to two other forfeiture systems. 
A. History of Civil Asset Forfeiture 
Civil asset forfeiture is a process based on the fictional idea that 
property itself commits wrongs.14  Because of the property’s purported 
wrongs, the government brings a civil action against the property.15  The 
action proceeds against the property, as the defendant, with no mention of 
the owner.16  The purpose of civil forfeiture is to prevent people from 
either profiting from criminal activity or from using property to facilitate 
crime.17  The legal fiction, of property committing wrongs, derives from 
biblical times.18 
Adopted by English common law, the legal fiction inspired and 
justified three different types of forfeitures.19  The first type of forfeiture 
required a person to forfeit any property that caused the death of one of 
the King’s subjects.20  The property owner relinquished the property to the 
King, as a “deodand.”21  The second type of forfeiture required a person 
to forfeit his estate upon conviction of a felony or treason.22  The third type 
of forfeiture, found in English statutes, called for the forfeiture of property 
used to violate the English revenue and customs laws.23  The third type of 
forfeiture codified a merging of the justifications behind the other two 
types of common law forfeiture: that property itself can commit a wrong 
and that a wrongdoer does not deserve to retain property.24 
                                                        
 14.   Krzystek, supra note 7, at 671. 
 15.   Andrew Crawford, Civil Asset Forfeiture in Massachusetts: A Flawed Incentive Structure 
and its Impact on Indigent Property Owners, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 257, 260 (2015). 
 16.   Id. 
 17.   Basler, supra note 6, at 668–69. 
 18.   Rachel L. Stuteville, Comment, Reverse Robin Hood: The Tale of How Texas Law 
Enforcement Has Used Civil Asset Forfeiture to Take from Property Owners and Pad the Pockets of 
Local Government—The Righteous Hunt for Reform Is on, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1169, 1178 (2014) 
(noting that the Bible commands people to “give to God any item or animal used or acquired in 
furtherance of a wrongdoing”).  Various sources cite Biblical passages for in support of this 
proposition.  See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.17 (1974) 
(citing Exodus 21:28) (“[I]f an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be stoned: and his 
flesh shall not be eaten.”). 
 19.   See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680–81. 
 20.   Id. 
 21.   Id.  “Deodand” comes from a Latin phrase meaning “to be given to God.”  Id. at 681 n.16. 
 22.   Id. at 682. 
 23.   Id. 
 24.   Id. 
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The third approach, what is now called civil asset forfeiture, carried 
over to the United States and its use predates the Constitution’s adoption.25  
The United States did not incorporate the other two types of common law 
forfeiture into American law.26  Like England’s forfeiture statutes, early 
American federal forfeiture laws targeted customs and revenue 
violations.27  The early laws only applied in limited circumstances: for 
forfeiture of ships and cargo connected to piracy, the slave trade, or 
smuggling.28 
Over time, the federal government expanded the applicability of civil 
forfeiture law.  The government first expanded the civil forfeiture laws 
during prohibition.29  The prohibition expansion permitted civil forfeiture 
of property used to manufacture and transport alcohol.30  But, the real 
catalyst for large scale expansion of civil forfeiture began with President 
Nixon’s “war on drugs.”31  In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,32 which included a provision on 
civil forfeiture.33  Specifically, 21 U.S.C. § 881 calls for forfeiture of any 
equipment associated with manufacturing or transporting controlled 
substances.34 
Through subsequent amendments to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act, Congress again expanded civil asset 
forfeiture.35  Congress now permitted forfeiture of any “proceeds” related 
to drug offenses and any property that “facilitated” a drug offense.36  The 
word “facilitated” is broadly construed and includes any property that 
makes any drug offense “less difficult and laborious.”37  The broad 
construction allows the government to seize an entire lot of property if a 
                                                        
 25.   Id. at 683. 
 26.   Id. at 682–83. 
 27.   Stuteville, supra note 18, at 1178. 
 28.   Stefan D. Cassella, The Uniform Innocent Owner Defense to Civil Asset Forfeiture: The 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 Creates a Uniform Innocent Owner Defense to Most Civil 
Forfeiture Cases Filed by the Federal Government, 89 KY. L.J. 653, 656 (2001).   
 29.   Karis Ann-Yu Chi, Comment, Follow the Money: Getting to the Root of the Problem with 
Civil Asset Forfeiture in California, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1635, 1638 (2002). 
 30.   Id. 
 31.   James Simon, Note, Civil Asset Forfeiture in Virginia: An Imperfect System, 74 WASH & 
LEE L. REV. 1295, 1303–04 (2017).  
 32.   Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21, 26, 31, 40, 42, 46, and 49 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 33.   Id. § 511, 84 Stat. 1276 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012)); Blumenson & Nilsen, 
supra note 13, at 44. 
 34.   21 U.S.C. § 881(a); Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 13, at 44. 
 35.   Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 13, at 44, 50. 
 36.   Id. at 45. 
 37.   United States v. One 1980 BMW 320, 559 F. Supp. 382, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).  
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drug offense occurs anywhere within the lot’s boundaries, because the lot 
“facilitated” a drug offense.38  In 1984, Congress encouraged states to help 
the federal government seize property through the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984.39  The Comprehensive Crime Control Act created an 
“equitable sharing program” that allows for federal and state law 
enforcement agencies to share the proceeds from forfeitures effectuated 
jointly.40  The government, using these provisions, extensively pursued 
forfeitures; for instance, in 1986 alone, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
deposited $93.7 million of forfeiture profits into its forfeiture fund.41 
By the late 1980s and 1990s, the public and many interest groups 
began to question the federal government’s expansive use of civil 
forfeiture.42  People also challenged the constitutionality of civil forfeiture, 
but the U.S. Supreme Court held that because civil forfeiture is remedial 
in nature, few constitutional protections actually apply.43  Specifically, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that in rem forfeiture did not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause nor the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.44  Other 
protections that are inapplicable in civil forfeiture actions include the 
presumption of innocence, the right to counsel, and the bar on hearsay 
evidence.45  The precedent, at the time, also consistently held that “an 
owner’s interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which 
the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be 
put to such use.”46 
                                                        
 38.   Iian D. Jablon, Note, Civil Forfeiture: A Modern Perspective on Roman Custom, 72 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 247, 264 (1998).  Russ Caswell, a motel owner, experienced the government’s expansive reach 
in 2009 when the government initiated civil asset forfeiture proceedings against his hotel because “15 
people had been arrested for drug crimes at his hotel during a 20-year period.”  Erin Fuchs, Guy 
Describes the ‘Living Nightmare’ of the US Government Trying to Seize His Family’s Motel, BUS. 
INSIDER (Apr. 16, 2015, 3:28 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/russ-caswell-speaks-at-civil-
forfeiture-hearing-2015-4.  When testifying in front of the U.S. Senate about this forfeiture, Caswell 
said, “I have never been charged with or convicted of a crime my entire life.  No one in my family, or 
any of our employees, has ever been involved in a crime at the motel concerning drugs . . . To us, the 
forfeiture case seemed ludicrous.”  Id.  
 39.   Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18, 19, 21, 28, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C. (2012)); Crawford, supra note 15, 
at 262. 
 40.   Crawford, supra note 15, at 262. 
 41.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 5. 
 42.   Rachel Jones, Note, Excessively Unconstitutional: Civil Asset Forfeiture and the Excessive 
Fines Clause in Virginia, 25 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1393, 1400 (2017). 
 43.   See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 278 (1996); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 
452–53 (1996). 
 44.   Ursery, 518 U.S. at 276; Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452. 
 45.   Michael van den Berg, Comment, Proposing a Transactional Approach to Civil Forfeiture 
Reform, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 867, 893 (2015). 
 46.   Bennis, 516 U.S. at 446.  
 
722 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
Due to these rulings, people complained about the lack of protection 
for property owners in the government’s current forfeiture regime.47  
Interest groups on both sides of the political spectrum called for forfeiture 
reform to remedy this problem, including both the ACLU and National 
Rifle Association.48  In response to the criticism, Congress enacted the 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”).49  CAFRA is the 
current federal approach to civil asset forfeiture, which Congress enacted 
to “provide a more just and uniform procedure for federal civil 
forfeitures.”50 
The biggest change CAFRA implemented, to address growing 
concerns from the owner, is the “innocent owner defense.”51  The innocent 
owner defense provides that an owner’s property cannot be forfeited if the 
owner “did not know of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture” or “upon 
learning of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, [the owner] did all that 
reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to terminate such 
use of the property.”52  It also prevents forfeiture if the owner acquired the 
property after the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture occurred.53  Another 
change CAFRA implemented requires the government to establish a 
“substantial connection between the property and the offense” giving rise 
to forfeiture.54  Facially this provision appears to provide added protection 
for owners, but in practice a substantial connection showing only requires 
the government show that the property made the prohibited conduct “easy 
or less difficult.”55  Congress notably did not change the financial incentive 
inherent in forfeiture, which allowed the government to continue to profit 
from forfeitures.56  By 2014, the DOJ’s Forfeiture Fund’s “annual deposits 
had reached $4.5 billion—a 4,667 percent increase” from the profits 
deposited in 1986.57 
                                                        
 47.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 2. 
 48.   Marc S. Roy, United States Federal Forfeiture Law: Current Status and Implications of 
Expansion, 69 MISS. L.J. 373, 419 (1999). 
 49.   Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 983, 985 (2012); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2465–67 (2012)); Stuteville, supra note 18, at 1180. 
 50.   Stuteville, supra note 18, at 1180; Jones, supra note 42, at 1400. 
 51.   Stuteville, supra note 18, at 1180. 
 52.   18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 53.   Id. § 983(d)(3)(A). 
 54.   Id. § 983(c)(3). 
 55.   United States v. Approximately 50 Acres of Real Property etc., 920 F.2d 900, 902 (11th Cir. 
1991) (“the courts agree that property is used to ‘facilitate’ a crime when it makes the illegal activity 
‘easy or less difficult’”).  
 56.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 2, 5. 
 57.   Id. at 5. 
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While civil forfeiture developed and expanded on the federal level, 
civil forfeiture also grew locally.  By the 1970s even the U.S. Supreme 
Court acknowledged the expansive reach of state forfeiture statutes: “state 
forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of property that might be used 
in the conduct of a criminal enterprise.”58  States followed the federal 
government’s expansive forfeiture approach and also brought in large 
profits from forfeitures.59  For example, in 2012, twenty-six states and the 
District of Columbia collectively brought in more than $254 million in 
forfeiture profits.60  In recent years expansive forfeiture on both a state and 
federal level has prompted another surge of public concern and demands 
for reform.61  Some states responded by enacting reforms to their forfeiture 
systems with a focus on providing more protection for individual property 
rights.62  While others, like Kansas, have maintained forfeiture statutes that 
mirror CAFRA.63 
B. Current Approaches to Forfeiture 
An effective way to grasp KSASFA’s deficiencies is to examine other 
approaches to forfeiture.  Part 1 of this section details KSASFA’s current 
form.  Part 2 presents Missouri’s approach which will be considered a 
“middle” approach to forfeiture for the purposes of this Comment.  
Missouri is a middle approach because it provides more protections than 
KSASFA but not as many protections as the best jurisdiction.  Part 3 
examines New Mexico’s criminal forfeiture approach, which is currently 
hailed as one of the best approaches to forfeiture in the nation. 
1. Among the Worst: The Kansas Approach 
Kansas’ use of civil asset forfeiture laws can be traced back to its 
territorial days.64  The Kansas legislature nearly unanimously enacted 
KSASFA in 1994.65  On April 2, 2018, the Kansas Legislature passed 
                                                        
 58.   Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974). 
 59.   See CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 11. 
 60.   Id.  The twenty-six states include: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington and Wyoming.  Id. at 11 n.21. 
 61.   Basler, supra note 6, at 667. 
 62.   Id. 
 63.   Colin D. Wood, “When Good Property Goes Bad” A Primer on Kansas Asset Forfeiture 
Law and Procedure, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Mar. 2001, at 24, 24. 
 64.   Id. at 25. 
 65.   The Kansas House of Representatives passed KSASFA 117-5, and the Kansas Senate passed 
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House Bill 2459, which sought to address some concerns with the prior 
version of KSASFA.66  KSASFA provides for civil in rem forfeiture 
proceedings based on certain enumerated offenses.67  Thirty-one offenses 
give rise to civil forfeiture—the list covers a wide array of conduct 
including “violations involving controlled substances,”  “violations of the 
banking code,” and  “attempting to elude a police officer.”68  KSASFA 
states that conduct constituting any of the thirty-one offenses gives rise to 
forfeiture “whether or not there is a prosecution or conviction related to 
the offense.”69  Kansas allows for initial seizure of property with or 
without a warrant if the law enforcement officer finds probable cause that 
the property is subject to forfeiture based on its connection to one of the 
enumerated offenses.70  With numerous offenses giving rise to forfeiture 
and no conviction required, the result is that “everything, no matter its 
form, no matter its value” is forfeitable under KSA SFA.71 
Within ninety days of seizing the property, the law enforcement 
agency must file a “notice of pending forfeiture” with the court to initiate 
the forfeiture action against the seized property.72  Once the law 
enforcement agency initiates the action, the burden is then on the property 
owner73 to prove that his property is exempt from forfeiture.74  If the owner 
does not contest the action within thirty days, then the government can ask 
the court for an order of forfeiture.75  The court will enter an order of 
forfeiture if the government establishes that it had probable cause to seize 
the property, and it properly filed the notice of forfeiture.76 
                                                        
it 38-1. Colin D. Wood & Gaten T. Wood, Unfairly Maligned: The Myths Surrounding the Kansas 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Debate, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Mar. 2017, at 44, 45 n.8, 48. 
 66.   H.B. 2459, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2018). The updated provisions are effective July 1, 
2018.  Id.  The changes implemented by House Bill 2459 are reflected, when applicable, throughout 
the remainder of this Comment.   
 67.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4104 (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
 68.   Id. 
 69.   Id. 
 70.   Id. § 60-4107(a) & (b) (2005 & Supp. 2017).  Probable cause is “[a] reasonable ground to 
suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime . . . which amounts to more than a bare 
suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.”  Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 71.   Wood, supra note 63, at 25. 
 72.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4109(a)(1) (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
 73.   KSASFA only allows an owner of, or an interest holder in, the property to contest the 
forfeiture.  State ex rel. Kan. Highway Patrol v. One 1995 Chevrolet Caprice Classic/Impala SS VIN 
31G1BL52P8SR191732, 382 P.3d 476, 478 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
4111(a) (2005 & Supp. 2017)). 
 74.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4110(a)(1)–(2) (2005). 
 75.   Id. § 60-4116(a) (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
 76.   Id. 
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If, on the other hand, the owner does contest the forfeiture, the 
property owner must file a “petition for recognition of exemption” within 
sixty days of the notice of pending forfeiture.77  KSASFA requires that the 
property owner’s petition include: 
(1)  The caption of the proceedings and identifying number, if any, as set 
forth on the notice of pending forfeiture or complaint, the name of the 
claimant, and the name of the plaintiff’s attorney who authorized the 
notice of pending forfeiture or complaint; (2)  The address where the 
claimant will accept mail; (3)  The nature and extent of the claimant’s 
interest in the property; and (4)  When and how the claimant obtained an 
interest in the property.78 
Once the petition is filed, the matter is set for a bench trial where the court 
alone will decide whether the property is subject to forfeiture. 79  At the 
hearing, the burden is first on the government to prove that the owner 
“engaged in conduct giving rise to forfeiture” and that the seized property 
was involved in that conduct.80  The government must establish that the 
property is subject to forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence.81 
KSASFA contains a few provisions that help the government carry its 
burden.  KSASFA states that if the government seized the property on the 
theory that the property was “proceeds of conduct giving rise to forfeiture” 
then the government does not have to pinpoint the specific transaction the 
property derived from.82  KSASFA, prior to passage of House Bill 2459, 
contained many rebuttable presumptions that, if the preliminary fact was 
proven, created the presumption that the property was subject to 
forfeiture.83  However, House Bill 2459 did away with the rebuttable 
                                                        
 77.   Id. § 60-4110(a)(1)–(2) (2005); H.B. 2459, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2018). 
 78.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4111(b)(1)–(7) (2005 & Supp. 2017); H.B. 2459. The newly enacted 
legislation decreased the necessary requirements in the property owner’s petition from seven specific 
requirements to the four cited above.  Id.  
 79.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4113(g) (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
 80.   Id. § 60-4112(k) (2005 & Supp. 2017). H.B. 2459. 
 81.   2017 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4113(g).  In Kansas, as in most jurisdictions, a 
“‘[p]reponderance of evidence’ is defined as ‘evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing 
than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it[]’ . . . [it] means that evidence which shows a 
fact is more probably true than not true.”  Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 874 P.2d 1188, 1197 (Kan. 1994) 
(quoting Preponderance of Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).  Kan. H. B. 2459 
recodifies this requirement as KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4113(h).  
 82.   2017 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4112(j); H.B. 2459 recodifies this as KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
4112(k). H.B. 2459, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2018) 
 83.   See 2017 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4112(s), (j); City of Hoisington v. $2,044 in U.S. Currency, 
8 P.3d 58, 62 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that money found in a person’s pocket was presumed 
forfeitable because controlled substances were found in her purse which was “never more than an 
arm’s reach away” thereby fulfilling the “close proximity” requirement); State v. 1978 Chevrolet 
Auto., 835 P.2d 1376, 1378–79 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that money found on a person and seized 
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presumption approach.84  Instead, the court is to look at “the totality of the 
circumstances [to] determine if the property of a person is subject to 
forfeiture.”85  The proximity of the property to contraband is now treated 
simply as one factor for forfeiture, instead of a rebuttable presumption 
commanding forfeiture.86 
Once the government establishes that the property is forfeitable, then 
the burden shifts to the property owner to prove that his property is exempt 
from forfeiture.87  KSASFA provides a few narrow reasons that a property 
owner’s property is exempt from forfeiture—for example, if the owner 
received the property after the conduct that would qualify the property for 
forfeiture occurred.88  The property owner must prove the property is 
exempt by a preponderance of the evidence.89  In other words, in Kansas 
the property owner’s “property is guilty until [the property owner] 
prove[s] it innocent.”90  Due to the heavy burden—of proving their 
property innocent—that KSASFA thrusts on property owners, Kansas 
earned a “F” in the owner’s burden category.91 
KSASFA also earned a “F” in the financial incentives category. 92  The 
financial incentives come into play when the government meets its burden, 
and the claimant does not.  In that case, the court will issue an order 
transferring title of the forfeited property to the law enforcement agency.93  
The law enforcement agency is then free to decide whether to keep and 
use the property, sell the property and keep the profits, or destroy the 
property.94 
                                                        
was presumed forfeitable because it was considered in “close proximity” to drugs found inside the 
vehicle). 
 84.   H.B. 2459.  
 85.   Id. 
 86.   Id. 
 87.   Wood, supra note 63, at 28. 
 88.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4106(a) (2005). 
 89.   Id. § 60-4113(h) (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
 90.   Jonathan Shorman, Kansas Asset Forfeiture Legislation Creates Unlikely Allies in Support, 
TOPEKA CAP.-J. ONLINE (Jan. 24, 2017, 7:47 AM), http://cjonline.com/news/state-government/2017-
01-24/kansas-asset-forfeiture-legislation-creates-unlikely-allies-support (quoting Representative Gail 
Finney). 
 91.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 151. 
 92.   Id. 
 93.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4116(b) (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
 94.   Id. § 60-4117(a)(1)–(3) (2005 & Supp. 2017).  The only evident restrictions on the law 
enforcement agency’s discretion in choosing how to use the property is that if it is a controlled 
substance or other contraband, it must be “destroy[ed] or use[d] for investigative or training purposes” 
and if they choose to sell the property, it must “not [be property] required by law to be destroyed.”  Id. 
§ 60-4117(a)(2)–(3). 
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Other states allow for law enforcement to keep all (or more than 95%) 
of the forfeiture proceeds including: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming.95  Many of these same states, like Kansas, place 
the burden on the owner not the government.96  Most of these other states 
received an overall grade of  “D+” or lower for their approach to 
forfeiture.97  KSASFA’s approach to forfeiture is among the worst; it 
provides little protection to owners and creates a high potential for abuse. 
2. A Middle Approach: Missouri 
In contrast, Missouri receives a “B+” for its approach to forfeiture by 
providing additional protections that KSASFA lacks.98  Missouri’s asset 
forfeiture statutes are known as the Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act 
(“CAFA”).99  CAFA received higher grades than KAFSA in two 
categories: standard of proof and financial incentive category.100  In 
relation to the burden of proof category, CAFA, unlike KSASFA, requires 
a criminal conviction before forfeiture is permitted: “no property shall be 
forfeited unless the person charged is found guilty of or pleads guilty to a 
felony substantially related to the forfeiture.”101  After a criminal 
conviction is secured, CAFA requires the government to prove that the 
property is subject to forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence.102  In 
practical effect, CAFA requires a high standard of proof—requiring proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has occurred and then proof that 
the property is forfeitable by a preponderance of the evidence.  CAFA 
earned a “B” for its high standard of proof.103  In regard to the financial 
incentive category, Missouri law enforcement agencies do not get to keep 
any of the funds or property from forfeitures.104  Instead, CAFA provides 
                                                        
 95.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 151. 
 96.   Id. 
 97.   See id. at 22.  The IJ assigned each jurisdiction an overall grade based on the jurisdiction’s 
individual grades in three categories: financial incentive to seize, the government’s standard of proof 
to forfeit, and the burden on property owners.  Id. at 14. 
 98.   Id. at 22. 
 99.   MO. REV. STAT. § 513.600–513.645 (West 2002). 
 100.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 150–51. 
 101.   MO. REV. STAT. § 513.617.1. (West 2002). 
 102.   Id.; CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 17. 
 103.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 150. 
 104.   Id. at 14. 
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that forfeiture profits will be used to fund Missouri schools.105  CAFA 
earned an “A” for its approach to curbing the financial incentives of 
forfeiture.106 
CAFA also includes a few other protective provisions that KSASFA 
does not.  First, CAFA allows for any party to demand a jury trial instead 
of only permitting a bench trial.107  Second, CAFA requires annual 
reporting of the forfeitures.108  While KSASFA only provides for reporting 
to the legislature, CAFA requires centralized reporting to the Missouri 
Department of Public Safety.109  These centralized reports are considered 
“open record[s].”110  CAFA also contains a separate provision requiring 
law enforcement agencies, who were involved in federal forfeitures, to file 
reports in the same manner.111  Missouri, though not required to by statute, 
published the 2015 federal report on the State Auditors website allowing 
the public to freely access this information.112  CAFA, unlike KSASFA, 
also includes an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with the 
reporting requirements: “[i]ntentional or knowing failure to comply with 
any reporting requirement . . . shall be a class A misdemeanor, punishable 
by a fine of up to one thousand dollars.”113  CAFA, through these 
provisions, provides a few additional protections that are not found in 
KSASFA. 
However, the CAFA forfeiture approach still has flaws.  First, 
CAFA’s reach extends even further than KSASFA by allowing forfeiture 
of “[a]ll property of every kind . . . used or intended for use in the course 
of, derived from, or realized through criminal activity.”114  This means that 
forfeiture is not limited to a list of certain enumerated offenses like in 
KSASFA. Instead any criminal activity that leads to a conviction can 
provide the basis for forfeiture.  Second, like KSASFA, CAFA earned an 
“F” in the burden on the property owner category because CAFA also 
requires the property owner to prove their property is not subject to 
                                                        
 105.   MO. CONST. Art. IX, § 7; MO. REV. STAT. § 513.623 (West 2002). 
 106.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 151. 
 107.   MO. REV. STAT. § 513.612 (West 2002). 
 108.   Id. § 513.607.8.–9. (West 2002). 
 109.   Id. § 513.607.8. 
 110.   Id. 
 111.   Id. § 513.653.1. (West 2002). 
 112.   See NICOLE GALLOWAY, CPA, OFFICE OF MO. ST. AUDITOR, REPORT NO. 2016-034, 
COMPILATION OF 2015 FEDERAL FORFEITURE REPORTS (2016), https://app.auditor.mo.gov/ 
Repository/Press/2016034412491.pdf; CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 35.  
 113.   MO. REV. STAT. § 513.607.10. 
 114.   Id. § 513.607(1). 
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forfeiture.115  Overall, CAFA can be considered a middle approach to 
forfeiture—solving some of the problems associated with civil forfeiture 
but still leaving many unaddressed. 
3. A National Leader: New Mexico 
New Mexico is on the opposite end of the forfeiture spectrum from 
KSASFA.  In 2015, New Mexico completely overhauled its forfeiture 
statutes in order to make its standards more uniform and to better “protect 
people’s constitutional rights.”116  It is now the only state to receive an “A-
” from the IJ for its forfeiture laws out of all fifty states and the federal 
government,117 and it is considered one of the strictest approaches to 
forfeiture in the nation.118  New Mexico is a “clear example for other states 
to follow in protecting people from unjust forfeitures.”119  New Mexico’s 
forfeiture law overhaul came after it garnered national attention from a 
2014 civil asset forfeiture conference held in Las Cruces, New Mexico.120  
The conference included presentations and tips on how to write deceptive 
forfeiture complaints—with one attorney describing his filings as “a 
masterpiece of deception”—as well as tips on how law enforcement could 
target and seize “good car[s].”121  Even more flagrant, one Las Cruces City 
Attorney described how law enforcement could manipulate drug laws to 
seize expensive houses: 
You liberalize marijuana so somebody can sell it, they sell the marijuana 
out of the house, then you seize the house, which is like 10 bucks of 
marijuana and you [the police] get a $300,000 house. What a deal. That’s 
really exciting. They get what they want, and you get what you want.122 
In response, the New Mexico Legislature reformed New Mexico’s 
                                                        
 115.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 150–51; MO. REV. STAT. § 513.615 (West 2002). 
 116.   See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-2.A. (West 2013, Westlaw through 2018); Forfeiture Act, 
N.M. ST. TREASURER’S OFF., http://www.nmsto.gov/forfeiture/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2018). 
 117.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 22 (giving New Mexico an A- grade and ranking it the highest 
jurisdiction in regard to civil forfeiture laws). 
 118.   Mary Hudetz, Forfeiture Reform Aligns Likes of Billionaire Charles Koch, ACLU, TOPEKA 
CAP.-J. ONLINE (Oct. 15, 2016, 5:49 AM), http://www.cjonline.com/news/2015-10-15/forfeiture-
reform-aligns-likes-billionaire-charles-koch-aclu. 
 119.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 23. 
 120.   Nick Sibilla, “If in Doubt. . .Take It!” Behind Closed Doors, Government Officials Make 
Shocking Comments About Civil Forfeiture, BUZZFEED (Nov. 10, 2014 7:04 AM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/nicks29/aif-in-doubtatake-ita-behind-closed-doors-4y3w. 
 121.   Id. 
 122.   Id. (discussing how even if a state legalizes marijuana, under the federal equitable sharing 
program, law enforcement could still reap the profits of a forfeiture for mere possession of marijuana 
since it is a federal offense).   
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Forfeiture Act (“Forfeiture Act”)123 from a civil forfeiture act to a criminal 
forfeiture act which only allows forfeiture when: “(1) the person was 
arrested for an offense to which forfeiture applies; (2) the person is 
convicted by a criminal court of the offense; and (3) the state establishes 
by clear and convincing evidence that the property is subject to 
forfeiture.”124  The Forfeiture Act explicitly states that its purpose is to 
“ensure that only criminal forfeiture is allowed in this state.”125  Criminal 
forfeiture differs from civil forfeiture because the forfeiture action is based 
on a person’s criminal conviction, and it imposes forfeiture of the property 
as part of the sentence.126  Criminal forfeiture, unlike civil forfeiture, 
allows the defendant to exercise all of his constitutional rights during the 
criminal proceeding.127  Effectively, property will not be forfeited in a 
criminal forfeiture action unless the government proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crime and the 
government proves that the seized property is connected to that crime.128 
Due to the Forfeiture Act’s criminal forfeiture approach, it differs in 
significant ways from KSASFA’s civil forfeiture approach.  First, in 
criminal forfeiture actions the burden to prove that the property is subject 
to forfeiture is on the government, not on the property owner: the seizing 
law enforcement agency must file a forfeiture complaint to initiate the 
action,129 and the owner then files an answer to the complaint.130  The 
forfeiture action occurs after the criminal proceeding.131  In the forfeiture 
action, the government must prove that the seized property is subject to 
forfeiture by a clear and convincing evidence standard.132  Consequently, 
the government’s burden is substantial: it must first prove the criminal 
conduct beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a conviction and then it must 
prove that the property is forfeitable by a clear and convincing evidence 
standard.  New Mexico earned an “A” for the burden on an owner category 
since it placed the heavy burden on the government.133  The second 
                                                        
 123.   N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-1 (West 2013, Westlaw through 2018). 
 124.   Id. § 31-27-4.A.(1)–(3) (West 2013, Westlaw through 2018). 
 125.   Id. § 31-27-2.A.(6) (West 2013, Westlaw through 2018). 
 126.   Stuteville, supra note 18, at 1175–76. 
 127.   Id. at 1176. 
 128.   Id.  
 129.   N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-5.A. (West 2013, Westlaw through 2018). 
 130.   Id. § 31-27-6.A. (West 2013, Westlaw through 2018). 
 131.   Id. § 31-27-6.C. 
 132.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 151.  “[C]lear and convincing evidence is something stronger 
than a mere ‘preponderance’ and yet something less than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’. . . when 
weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder’s mind is left with an abiding conviction 
that the evidence is true.”  In re Sedillo, 498 P.2d 1353, 1355 (N.M. 1972). 
 133.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 151. 
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significant difference is that the criminal forfeiture approach provides 
more protection for the property owner.134  For example, the Forfeiture Act 
states that a property owner may have an attorney appointed in the 
forfeiture proceeding if the criminal defendant was appointed a public 
defender for his criminal case.135 
In addition to the protections provided by adopting a criminal 
forfeiture approach, the Forfeiture Act contains other provisions that 
narrow the potential for governmental abuse. The Forfeiture Act takes the 
financial incentive away from law enforcement.  Under the Forfeiture Act, 
the money from the sale of forfeited property must be deposited into the 
State’s “general fund.”136  It also explicitly states that law enforcement 
agencies may not keep any forfeited or abandoned property.137  These 
provisions curb the financial incentive for law enforcement to seize 
property—since the law enforcement agency does not get any of the 
property or money from forfeitures made—and earned New Mexico an 
“A” in the financial incentive category.138 
The Forfeiture Act also prevents local agencies from profiting from 
forfeiture under the federal equitable sharing program unless: the 
property’s value is at least $50,000, the conduct giving rise to forfeiture is 
“interstate in nature and sufficiently complex[,]” and the property is only 
forfeitable under federal law.139  In case the purpose of the ban on using 
the federal equitable sharing program is unclear, the provision explicitly 
states that “[t]he law enforcement agency shall not transfer property to the 
federal government if the transfer would circumvent the protections of the 
Forfeiture Act that would otherwise be available to a putative interest 
holder in the property.”140  The Forfeiture Act, through this section, 
ensures that local law enforcement will not receive profits from forfeiture 
by simply circumventing the strict state forfeiture process and taking 
advantage of the federal forfeiture program.141 
                                                        
 134.   Stuteville, supra note 18, at 1176. 
 135.   N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-6.C.  
 136.   Id. § 31-27-7.B. (West 2013, Westlaw through 2018).  The general fund is where “all 
revenues not otherwise allocated by law” are deposited and expenditures from the fund must be 
“authorized by the legislature.”  Id. § 6-4-2 (West 2012). 
 137.   Id. § 31-27-8.D. (Westlaw through 2018). 
 138.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 151. 
 139.   N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-11.A. (Westlaw through 2018). 
 140.   Id. § 31-27-11.B.  
 141.   See supra Section II.A.  The equitable sharing program was implemented in an amendment 
that expanded civil forfeiture.  Crawford, supra note 15, at 262.  It allows for federal and state agencies 
to share the profits of any joint forfeitures.  Id. 
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Additionally, the Forfeiture Act ensures public transparency.  It 
requires detailed, centralized annual reporting by all law enforcement 
agencies.142  Each law enforcement agency must submit an annual report 
that includes the number of seizures of property, the number of seizure of 
cash, and the quantity of each.143  Further, each agency must include the 
“class of crime” that prompted the seizure.144  These reports are submitted 
to the New Mexico Department of Public Safety and the district attorney’s 
office in that agency’s jurisdiction.145  The Department of Public Safety is 
then tasked with compiling those reports into an aggregate report.146  Then, 
the Department of Public Safety is required to publish that aggregate report 
on its website by April 1 of the next year, allowing free public access.147 
While New Mexico exemplifies the most comprehensive approach to 
forfeiture reform, it is not the only state that has taken action to heighten 
its forfeiture standards.  For instance, some other states also require a 
conviction before property can be forfeited, including: California, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, and Vermont.148  
A handful of jurisdictions reformed their laws to ensure the government 
carries the burden in forfeiture actions: California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Florida, Mississippi, Montana, New York, Oregon, Utah, and the District 
of Columbia.149  Other jurisdictions have taken the entire financial 
incentive away from law enforcement: Indiana, Maine, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia.150  Currently, forgoing 
a civil forfeiture system for a criminal forfeiture system is a minority view, 
but adopting a criminal forfeiture approach solves many problems. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Kansas Legislature must reform KSASFA from a civil forfeiture 
system to a criminal forfeiture system to better effectuate its purpose, 
protect individuals’ property rights, and curb governmental overreach and 
abuse.  The necessity of such reform is clear when examining the problems 
created by KSASFA’s current approach.  These problems can be broken 
up into two broad categories: (1) disregard for individuals’ property rights 
                                                        
 142.   See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-9 (Westlaw through 2018). 
 143.   Id. § 31-27-9.A.(1)–(2). 
 144.   Id. § 31-27-9.A.(4). 
 145.   Id. § 31-27-9.B. 
 146.   Id. § 31-27-9.C. 
 147.   Id. § 31-27-9.D. 
 148.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 17. 
 149.   Id. at 20. 
 150.   Id. at 14. 
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and due process and (2) governmental abuse and overreach.  Section A 
will focus on KSASFA’s disregard for individuals’ property rights and due 
process.  Section B will address KSASFA’s high potential for 
governmental abuse and overreach.  Each Section will first address the 
problems caused and then propose necessary reforms to remedy the 
problems discussed. 
A. Property Rights and Due Process 
Theoretically, Americans are constitutionally entitled to certain 
protections from the government in regard to their property.151  However, 
these constitutional rights, to be secure in property and to be afforded due 
process of law, are actually inapplicable to civil asset forfeiture cases.152  
Part 1 will illustrate the problems caused by KSASFA’s civil forfeiture 
approach in relation to individuals’ property rights and due process.  Part 
2 will then discuss how the Kansas Legislature needs to reform KSASFA 
to give Kansas property owners security in their property and afford 
Kansans due process of law when the government seizes their property. 
1. Deprivation of Property and Due Process Rights Caused by 
KSASFA’s Current Approach 
On a conceptual level, the inapplicability of certain constitutional 
protections in civil forfeiture cases is unjust.  The United State Supreme 
Court’s decision that civil forfeiture is remedial153 is arbitrary because the 
ultimate legal effect of a civil forfeiture case and a criminal forfeiture case 
is virtually identical.  In a civil forfeiture action, it is clear that an inanimate 
object cannot take any action, so the underlying conduct that civil asset 
forfeiture is concerned with is actually conduct perpetrated by an 
individual (presumably the property owner).  The property cannot defend 
itself, so a civil forfeiture action requires the owner to contest the forfeiture 
of the property.154  Perhaps most important, civil asset forfeiture ultimately 
results in the forfeiture of the owner’s property. 
                                                        
 151.   See U.S. CONST. amends. V (requiring due process for any criminal proceeding denying a 
citizen’s property), IV (protecting citizens’ property from unreasonable searches and seizures), XIV § 
1 (prohibiting states from depriving any person of property without due process). 
 152.   Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 13, at 48–50.  
 153.   United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 278 (1996). 
 154.   See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4110(a)(1)–(2) (2005). 
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In comparison, criminal forfeiture also focuses on the individual’s 
criminal conduct.155  Criminal forfeiture requires any objection to 
forfeiture to come from the property owner.156  Ultimately, criminal 
forfeiture also results in the forfeiture of the owner’s property as part of 
the individual’s sentence.157  Comparing civil forfeiture and criminal 
forfeiture actions in these broad strokes demonstrates that the action 
required and the legal effect is the same in both: an individual’s criminal 
conduct leads to asset seizure, the individual must contest the seizure, and 
the individual forfeits his property if the action is successful.  In both 
actions the property owner is effectively punished because he loses his 
property.158  Since the actions and the result are the same, choosing to 
distinguish between civil and criminal forfeiture, and allow only property 
owners to exercise their rights in civil forfeiture action, is a judicial 
misstep that should promptly be abandoned. 
Aside from the distinction itself being arbitrary, there are also serious 
consequences associated with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that 
property deprivation is only considered punishment if the action 
proceeded against the owner.159  People have the right “to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures,”160 and no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”161  These Constitutional 
protections only protect “a person” from the government.162  Therefore, 
when the government proceeds against the property itself, in a civil 
forfeiture action, these rights are theoretically not implicated.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision to classify civil forfeiture as remedial allows for 
a complete circumvention of an individual’s property rights and due 
process rights.  Such a circumvention is contrary to the rights given to 
                                                        
 155.   Stuteville, supra note 18, at 1176. 
 156.   Id.  
 157.   Id. at 1175–76.  
 158.   Roy, supra note 48, at 417. 
 159.   See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 278 (1996). 
 160.   U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  This provision applies to state action by incorporation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law[.]”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
655 (1961). 
 161.   U.S. CONST. amend. V.  This provision applies to state action by incorporation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law[.]”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897). 
 162.   U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
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citizens in the Constitution and is inherently unjust considering that the 
deprivation is based on fiction (that the property is the defendant). 
KSASFA, by calling for civil forfeiture in an in rem proceeding,163 
takes full advantage of the U.S. Supreme Court’s approved process to 
disregard most individual rights and due process protections.  First, 
KSASFA does not provide representation to the indigent owner, forcing 
owners who want to contest the forfeiture to act pro se or pay for 
counsel.164  Usually, an individual accused of criminal activity is 
guaranteed the right to counsel.165  However, in a civil forfeiture case, this 
right does not apply because the action is technically a civil case and the 
property owner is classified as some type of third party to the action.166  
This deprivation is unjust considering the entire forfeiture action is based 
on the alleged criminal activity of the property owner.  To deprive an 
owner of property based on his criminal activity, but not provide him an 
attorney, based solely on a technicality—that rights apply to people and 
not property—is contrary to the constitutional protections to which an 
individual is entitled. 
While the deprivation of counsel may seem minor, it carries expansive 
legal consequences and is exacerbated since the property owner carries the 
burden in civil asset forfeiture actions.  KSASFA places a heavy burden 
on the property owner.  The owner must (1) be the actual owner or interest 
holder of the property; (2) file a written claim within thirty days of notice 
of the forfeiture action; (3) file the claim and all supporting documents 
under oath and in proper form; and (4) establish that the property in 
question is not subject to forfeiture.167  Any property owner who wants to 
defend his property, but cannot afford an attorney, must file the papers 
himself, meet all filing deadlines, and conform to all substance and form 
requirements.  This requires substantial, specific action from the owner 
and one misstep could result in major consequences—forfeiture of the 
property.  The burden is magnified since the government is well 
                                                        
 163.   State v. Yeoman, 951 P.2d 964, 966 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997). 
 164.   See Shorman, supra note 90 (“Often . . . a claim isn’t made because the individuals can’t 
afford an attorney, argues Micah Kubic, director of ACLU of Kansas.  Individuals don’t have the right 
to an attorney in asset forfeiture proceedings. . .and sometimes the money that they could have used 
to pay for legal aid is what has been seized.”). 
 165.   U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 166.   Krzystek, supra note 7, at 670 (discussing the federal civil asset forfeiture approach but 
KSASFA is so similar to the federal approach that the general proposition applies KSASFA as well). 
 167.   State ex rel. Kan. Highway Patrol v. One 1995 Chevrolet Caprice Classic/Impala SS VIN 
31G1BL52P8SR191732, 382 P.3d 476, 478–79 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016). H.B. 2459 attempts to lessen 
the burden on the property owner by stating that “substantial compliance with [the requirements for 
filing a claim] shall be deemed sufficient,” however, the effect of such a provision is yet to be seen. 
H.B. 2459, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2018) (to be codified as KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4111(c)). 
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represented in these actions.168  Assuming the property owner meets all the 
deadlines and substance requirements, he must then, with no legal training 
or experience, out-advocate an experienced attorney who likely has 
previous experience representing the government in forfeiture actions. 
One of the heaviest burdens the owner carries is proving the property 
is exempt from forfeiture.169  This means that “with [Kansas’] current civil 
asset forfeiture act, [Kansans’] property is guilty until [the property 
owners] prove it innocent.”170  This is completely contrary to the normal 
presumption in our justice system that one is innocent until proven guilty.  
Further, this presumption of guilt is easily established considering the 
government’s low burden of proof to seize and forfeit the property.  
KSASFA only requires the government to show the property is subject to 
forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence.171 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in discussing different standards of proof, 
stated that a “standard of proof ‘serves to allocate the risk of error between 
the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate 
decision.’”172  In regard to a preponderance of the evidence, the Court said 
that “[b]ecause the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard results in a 
roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants, we presume 
that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants 
unless ‘particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.’” 
173  The Constitution states that “life, liberty, and property” cannot be 
deprived without due process of law.174  This would seem to indicate that 
property should be considered an important individual interest.  Requiring 
high standards for the owner and low standards for the government 
circumvents the ideals of due process and protecting property owners’ 
interests.  Such disregard for an individual’s due process rights should not 
be tolerated when a person’s property is at stake regardless of who (or 
what) is officially named as the defendant. 
                                                        
 168.   Krzystek, supra note 7, at 680 (discussing the federal civil asset forfeiture approach but 
KSASFA is so similar to the federal approach that the general proposition applies KSASFA as well). 
 169.   Wood, supra note 63, at 28; see KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-4110(b)(1), 60-4106(a)(1)–(5) 
(2005). 
 170.   Shorman, supra note 90 (quoting Kansas Representative Gail Finney). 
 171.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4113(g) (2005 & Supp. 2017); State ex rel. Love v. One 1967 
Chevrolet El Camino Bearing Vin #136807Z141367, 799 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Kan. 1990). 
 172.   Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 
411 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). 
 173.   Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Herman & Maclean, 459 U.S. at 389–
90). 
 174.   U.S. CONST. amend. V.  This provision applies to state action by incorporation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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It would be unfair to say that no constitutional protections apply to 
civil asset forfeiture. The U.S. Supreme Court held the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to civil forfeiture actions.175  
KSASFA codified this requirement as a proportionality finding.176  
However, KSASFA’s proportionality protection is virtually meaningless 
in practice.  The protection requires that the forfeiture not be grossly 
disproportionate to “the nature and severity of the owner’s conduct.”177  
KSASFA permits forfeiture regardless of whether there is a conviction or 
even charges filed.178  The effect of such language is that any 
proportionality analysis is based on the “nature and severity” of the alleged 
offense.  It is not hard to imagine that the alleged criminal activity could 
actually be of a higher severity and nature than what actually occurred.  
For instance, in a drug offense it could be alleged that the contraband and 
property seized were used to facilitate drug trafficking and distribution, 
when in actuality it was only used for personal use.  Such a distinction is 
irrelevant under KSASFA, so long as the law enforcement agency can 
prove they had probable cause to seize the items for drug trafficking.179  
KSASFA effectively renders the proportionality protection of the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment meaningless. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to differentiate between civil and 
criminal forfeiture is arbitrary and based on a legal fiction.  Using this 
fictitious distinction, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled many constitutional 
protections inapplicable to civil forfeiture actions.  The Court’s decision 
deprives property owners of the protections guaranteed to individuals 
when the government tries to seize and forfeit their property.  KSASFA’s 
civil forfeiture approach allows for these deprivations at the expense of 
individual property owners.  The Kansas Legislature must address these 
problems to ensure that forfeitures are just and that property owners can 
exercise their rights. 
2. Protecting Property Rights and Due Process 
Because the U.S. Supreme Court distinguishes civil forfeiture from 
criminal forfeiture and only applies constitutional protections in the latter, 
the Kansas Legislature must change KSASFA to a criminal forfeiture 
system.  Changing to a criminal forfeiture system is the best solution to 
                                                        
 175.   Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). 
 176.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4106(c) (2005). 
 177.   Id. 
 178.   Id. § 60-4104 (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
 179.   See id. § 60-4107(a)–(b) (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
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ensure that property owners are able to exercise all of their constitutional 
rights when the government seizes their property.  To effectuate this 
change, KSASFA must, first and foremost, remove the language “whether 
or not there is a prosecution or conviction related to the offense.”180 
KSASFA must adopt language that explicitly requires a conviction 
against the property owner and a finding that the property was related to a 
convicted offense before property can be forfeited.  Such a requirement 
will ensure that seized property is actually connected to a criminal offense, 
not just connected to some speculative, vague criminal conduct.  Requiring 
a conviction prior to forfeiture is an approach that other states have taken 
such as: California, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Oregon, and Vermont.181  Notably, New Mexico took this 
approach182 and is now hailed as having one of the strictest forfeiture 
laws.183  Other states are also currently considering bills that would make 
a conviction a prerequisite to forfeiture.184 
Requiring a conviction prior to forfeiture solves many of the due 
process and individual rights concerns created by civil forfeiture.  First, by 
requiring a conviction prior to forfeiture, property owners are afforded the 
opportunity to exercise their constitutional rights in the criminal 
proceeding: the accused is afforded counsel, given the right to a jury trial, 
and permitted to refrain from incriminating himself.185  Second, by 
requiring a conviction prior to forfeiture, the burden is put on the 
government.  To secure a conviction the government must present 
evidence that convinces a jury that the criminal activity was perpetrated 
by the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt: 
                                                        
 180.   Id. § 60-4104. 
 181.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 17 fig.7; LEGISLATIVE DIV. OF POST AUDIT, PERFORMANCE 
AUDIT REPORT, SEIZED AND FORFEITED PROPERTY: EVALUATING COMPLIANCE WITH STATE LAW 
AND HOW PROCEEDS ARE TRACKED, USED, AND REPORTED, 12 figs.1-2 (2016) [hereinafter 
PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT], http://www.kslpa.org/media/files/reports/media/files/temp/r-16-
009.pdf. 
 182.   N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4.A.(1)–(3) (West 2013, Westlaw through 2018). 
 183.   Hudetz, supra note 118. 
 184.   Hawaii and West Virginia are both considering bills that would require conviction prior to 
forfeiture.  See S.B. 180, 29th Leg. (Haw. 2017), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2018/ 
bills/SB180_.pdf (introduced in 2017 and referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee in 
January 2018); H.B. 2992, 83rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018), http://www.wvlegislature.gov/ 
Bill_Text_HTML/2017_SESSIONS/RS/bills/hb2992%20intr.pdf (introduced on March 14, 2017 and 
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary). 
 185.   U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.  This provision applies to state action by incorporation under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and 
by evidence confined to that which long experience in the common-law 
tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized 
into rules of evidence consistent with that standard.  These rules are 
historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, 
liberty and property.186 
Then, the government must present evidence that the seized property is 
connected to the crime of conviction.187  Consequently, the government’s 
burden is substantial: it must prove the criminal conduct beyond a 
reasonable doubt—resulting in a conviction—then, prove that the property 
is forfeitable by whatever standard is adopted.  Placing the burden on the 
government also ensures that the property owner is presumed innocent, 
which is more in line with the traditional notions of justice in our legal 
system. 
Third, requiring a conviction ensures that the proportionality analysis 
of the Excessive Fines Clause is meaningful.  If the property owner is 
convicted of a crime, there is a definite offense on which to base the 
analysis.  There will no longer be uncertainty or dispute as to the “nature 
and severity” of the offense.  Overall, the Kansas Legislature must adopt 
a criminal forfeiture approach to ensure that property owners are able to 
exercise their constitutional rights. 
B. Governmental Abuse and Overreach 
Aside from a lack of due process and individual rights concerns, 
KSASFA’s approach to forfeiture also creates many opportunities for 
governmental abuse and overreach.  Part 1 will examine the provisions in 
KSASFA that allow for governmental abuse and overreach.  Part 2 will 
discuss changes that the Kansas Legislature must implement to ensure that 
Kansas property owners are protected from the government. 
1. Problems Caused by KSASFA’s Current Form 
This section focuses on two major problems caused by KSASFA that 
allow governmental abuse and overreach: financial incentives and 
governmental favoritism.  These problems derive from many sources 
                                                        
 186.   Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949). 
 187.   See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-6.C. (West 2013, Westlaw through 2018); see also 
CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 16–17 (showing that some states’ burden is “beyond a reasonable 
doubt/clear and convincing” while others are “beyond a reasonable doubt/preponderance of the 
evidence”). 
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including KSASFA itself, judicial interpretation of KSASFA, and the law 
in practice. This section will discuss each of these problems in turn. 
a. Financial Incentives 
KSASFA is ripe with opportunities for governmental abuse due to the 
state legislature’s broad wording or, in some cases, lack of wording.  The 
quintessential example of this permissive drafting is Section 60-4117.188  
The most substantial issue with this provision is that it allows law 
enforcement to keep the profits from the forfeitures that law enforcement 
officers effectuate.189  Facially, it appears to be a good fiscal move to allow 
extra proceeds to be allotted to law enforcement budgets without costing 
taxpayers, but it also creates a high risk for abuse.190  By allowing law 
enforcement agencies to keep the proceeds of forfeitures they initiate, the 
Kansas Legislature created a “policing for profit” system.191  The “policing 
for profit” concern is that because law enforcement benefits from 
forfeitures, there is a financial incentive for law enforcement to actively 
and aggressively pursue forfeitures.192 
Encouraging forfeiture through a policing for profit system is 
problematic.  First, it is counterintuitive that an officer should be fiscally 
rewarded for completing a task that is part of his normal job duties.  The 
counterintuitive nature of this system can be seen when imagining other 
analogous situations in which society recognizes that financial incentives 
should not be given to an officer for doing his job.  For example, when a 
reward is offered for information in a case and a law enforcement officer 
finds that information, he is not given the reward.  But KSASFA rewards 
law enforcement for effectuating forfeitures, something that is part of law 
enforcement’s daily duties. 
Second, a policing for profit system encourages law enforcement to 
target expensive or desirable assets.  AC Bushnell, a program director for 
DKT Liberty Project,193 says “[i]t looks like [the Kansas Highway Patrol 
                                                        
 188.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4117 (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
 189.   Id. 
 190.   CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 78 (“Kansas law enforcement agencies keep 100 percent of 
forfeiture proceeds. Although the Kansas attorney general has ruled that forfeiture funds may only be 
used for special law enforcement projects and not to meet normal operating expenses, this still provides 
considerable incentive to seize.”). 
 191.   See Simon, supra note 31, at 1309 (terming abuses for financial gain as “policing for profit”). 
 192.   Id. 
 193.   DKT Liberty Project is a non-profit located in Washington D.C. that is focused on protecting 
“individual liberty against encroachment by all levels of government” and government overreach.  
DKT Liberty Project, About Us, http://dktlibertyproject.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2018). 
 
2018 KANSAS STANDARD ASSET SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE ACT 741 
is] just looking for money.”194  Bushnell made this statement after the 
Kansas Highway Patrol seized three large sums of cash from out-of-state 
motorists and no criminal charges were ever brought.195  Other 
jurisdictions, which allowed law enforcement to keep the profits of 
forfeiture, also saw law enforcement target high value assets.  Prior to 
changing its forfeiture approach, New Mexico held a conference on civil 
asset forfeiture.196  At this conference, the speaker stated that they “always 
try to get . . . a good car.”197  He continued that officers on a stakeout 
noticed a 2008 Mercedes-Benz and decided that it would go for a large 
profit at public auction, so the officers seized it.198 
This targeting of expensive assets means that law enforcement is not 
really effectuating the KSASFA’s purpose: to ensure that property was not 
used for illegal purposes and to make illegal conduct unprofitable.199  
Instead, law enforcement is seizing property that makes their seizures 
profitable and provides their agencies with funding.  The profits from 
forfeiture can be substantial.  For example, in 2015, Kansas Highway 
Patrol deposited $842,041 from forfeitures into their agency forfeiture 
fund.200  Additionally, in 2015, the Kansas Highway Patrol “received more 
than $1.65 million” from the federal government based on their 
participation with federal law enforcement in effectuating federal 
forfeitures through the equitable sharing program.201 
The large profits from civil forfeitures cause even more problems 
considering KSASFA’s lack of oversight regarding proper use of those 
funds.  Regarding the use of forfeiture funds, KSASFA contains a general 
statutory restriction that forfeiture funds cannot be used for “normal 
operating expenses.”202  The legislature drafted this provision to ensure 
that law enforcement agencies do not come to rely on forfeitures as a 
source of department funding.203  However, the July 2016 Kansas 
forfeiture audit—conducted upon the request of Kansas State 
                                                        
 194.   Katie Moore, Accusations of Asset Seizure Pattern by Kansas Highway Patrol Raise 
Concerns, TOPEKA CAP.-J. ONLINE (Jan. 2, 2017, 1:47 PM), http://www.cjonline.com/news/crime-
courts/2017-01-02/accusations-asset-seizure-pattern-kansas-highway-patrol-raise-concerns. 
 195.   Id. 
 196.   Sibilla, supra note 120. 
 197.   Id. 
 198.   Id. 
 199.   State v. Yeoman, 951 P.2d 964, 966 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997). 
 200.   PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT, supra note 181, at 16. 
 201.   Moore, supra note 194. 
 202.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4117(e)(1) (2005 & Supp. 2017); PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT, 
supra note 183, at 28. 
 203.   PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT, supra note 181, at 28. 
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Representative Gail Finney, who is an advocate for reforming KSASFA—
found that the Kansas Highway Patrol appeared to spend some of its 
forfeiture funds on normal operating expenses in 2015.204  Specifically, the 
audit found that Kansas Highway Patrol spent $412,900 in forfeiture 
proceeds on employee salaries from December 1, 2012 through June 30, 
2015.205 
Because “normal operating expense” is not defined by statute, it is 
unclear whether salaries fall under the statutory prohibition.  However, 
applying forfeiture funds to employee salaries seems to be in direct 
opposition to the legislature’s intent in drafting this restriction.  If 
forfeiture funds are being used for salaries, then it stands to reason that the 
law enforcement agencies have an incentive to ensure that they seize at 
least the same amount of property every year or salaries (or perhaps jobs) 
may decrease.  This use of funds, to supplement the budget in providing 
salaries, is directly contrary to the law and makes the potential for 
“policing for profit” abuses more palpable.206 
House Bill 2459 added new subsections to § 60-4117 that enumerate 
how forfeiture funds should be used.207  While it is not clear how these 
provisions will work in practice, some of the requirements are likely too 
broad to effectively restrict the misuse of funds.  For instance, the 
provision that is to be codified as § 60-4117(e)(2)(F) states that the funds 
can be used to cover “the costs associated with a contract for a specific 
service that supports or enhances law enforcement.”208  Another 
“restriction,” to be codified as § 60-4117(e)(2)(A), states that funds may 
be used for “the support of investigations and operations that further the 
law enforcement agency’s goals or missions.”209 These supposed 
“restrictions” on the use of funds seem so broad that arguably anything 
with a connection to a law enforcement purpose would be permissible.  
Therefore, while it appears at first glance that House Bill 2459 addresses 
some of the policing for profit abuses, upon further examination it 
                                                        
 204.   Id. at 24–25, 28–29, 35. 
 205.   Id. at 28. 
 206.   See id. at 33 (“In this audit we found instances where agencies used their forfeiture proceeds 
for what appear to be normal operating expenses, but which are allowable due to the considerable 
discretion given under state law.  This increases the risk that these monies can be used to help augment 
agency budgets, and could create an incentive to seize more property in the future.”).  
 207.   H.B. 2459, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2018) (to be codified as KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
4117(e)(2)). 
 208.   Id.  
 209.   Id. 
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becomes clear that the enacted “restrictions” are still far too broad and 
leave the potential for abuse wide open.210 
The large profits derived from forfeiture also cause problems due to 
KSASFA’s bare minimum approach to reporting requirements and a lack 
of enforcement for violations of the meager reporting requirement.  
KSASFA’s language, prior to House Bill 2459, required law enforcement 
agencies to compile annual reports that detail the value of property 
received and how the proceeds were used.211  This report is to be submitted 
to the legislature.212  While this seems like a good approach to curbing 
possible forfeiture abuse, any positive value this provision lends to 
KSASFA’s forfeiture approach is severely undermined since the law in 
practice does not conform to this provision. 
The 2016 audit found that out of the six agencies audited, only two 
agencies—the Kansas Highway Patrol and Kansas Bureau of 
Investigation—complied with the statutory reporting requirements. 213  
The other four agencies were local agencies and none of them prepared or 
submitted the statutorily required report.214  What is more troubling is that 
this noncompliance with the reporting requirement is not new.  A 2000 
audit of Kansas civil asset forfeiture “also found that most local law 
enforcement agencies did not submit [the required] annual report.”215  This 
consistent lack of compliance makes the reporting requirement virtually 
meaningless. 
The lack of compliance with the reporting requirement is substantially 
more troubling considering that the Kansas Legislature is the body that is 
supposed to be ensuring compliance.  The legislature appointed itself as 
the overseer of the forfeiture reports.216  Therefore, it stands to reason that 
if the legislature is supposed to be receiving reports and agencies have not 
been submitting reports, then the legislature has been and is aware of the 
agencies’ noncompliance with the reporting requirement.  In practice, the 
legislature’s lack of oversight and the agencies’ lack of compliance means 
that forfeitures are going unchecked in Kansas. 
                                                        
 210.   As of the writing of this Comment, the provisions of House Bill 2459 have not gone into 
effect, therefore there is a possibility that the provisions will be interpreted narrower than the language 
appears to permit. 
 211.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4117(g) (2005 & Supp. 2017).  
 212.   Id. § 60-4117(g)(1). 
 213.   PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT, supra note 181, at 26. 
 214.   Id. 
 215.   Id. at 8.  
 216.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4117(g)(1). 
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Allowing the government to be the only entity that knows the extent 
of forfeitures in Kansas heightens the potential for abuse and cover up of 
extensive forfeiture.  For instance, in assembling its national comparison 
of forfeiture systems, in 2010, the IJ was unable to collect forfeiture data 
from Kansas because the government, the only one who has the forfeiture 
data, would not respond to requests.217  If the government is the only entity 
with information on forfeitures, the people of Kansas have no way of 
reviewing the forfeiture system in place or comparing it to other forfeiture 
systems. 
House Bill 2459 attempts to address a few of these concerns by 
creating a new section that purports to implement more stringent reporting 
requirements.  One major change is that the legislature is no longer 
responsible for gathering information on seizures; instead, the Kansas 
Bureau of Investigation (“KBI”) is tasked with creating and overseeing the 
“Kansas asset seizure and forfeiture repository.”218  The provisions state 
that each law enforcement agency shall submit reports to the Kansas asset 
seizure and forfeiture repository starting July 1, 2019.219  Finally, the 
provisions state that KBI “shall report to the legislature any law 
enforcement agencies in the state that have failed to come into compliance 
with the reporting requirements.”220 
While these additions seem to be a step in the right direction, the same 
potential for abuse, as discussed above, will continue to exist.  The new 
provision does not implement penalties for agencies that do not comply 
with the reporting requirements.  Instead, it just states that KBI is to report 
noncompliance to the legislature.  This “solution” for noncompliance is 
concerning given the legislature’s history of not taking action in the face 
of systemic noncompliance with the reporting requirements.  The effect of 
this provision is to simply add an agency, the KBI, between the seizing 
agency and the legislature.  This new system could simply create more 
plausible deniability for the Legislature, instead of addressing the actual 
problems of noncompliance with the reporting requirements.  As discussed 
above, since reports were due to the Legislature, if there was 
noncompliance then it is clear the Legislature was aware of it.  Whereas 
now, if noncompliance occurs, the Legislature can simply state that it was 
unaware of any noncompliance because KBI did not inform them of the 
noncompliance. 
                                                        
 217.   John Kramer, Kansas Earns “D” in “Policing for Profit” Report, INST. FOR JUST. (Mar. 26, 
2010), http://ij.org/press-release/kansas-earns-acanadacana-in-acanapolicing-for-profitacana-report/. 
 218.   H.B. 2459, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2018). 
 219.   Id. 
 220.   Id. 
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It is also concerning that the agency the Legislature appointed to 
oversee forfeitures is one of the agencies that effectuates forfeitures.  
Whether abuse occurs by KBI or not, there will be an appearance of 
impropriety and self-interest by allowing an agency that effectuates 
forfeiture to be the one monitoring forfeitures.  While the actual effect of 
the provision in practice is not known at this time, from its face it does not 
appear to address the underlying issues of KSASFA’s policing for profit 
system. 
The Kansas Legislature, through KSASFA’s financial incentives for 
law enforcement, created a high potential for governmental abuse.  The 
financial incentive and lack of reporting create a “policing for profit” 
system that encourages forfeitures.  The lack of stringent reporting 
requirements and the history of noncompliance further allow the 
substantial profits from forfeitures to go unchecked and unsupervised.  The 
Kansas Legislature needs to address these problems to limit the potential 
for governmental abuse and overreach. 
b. Government Favoritism 
KSASFA, through its language and interpretation, also gives the 
government a clear advantage in civil forfeiture cases.  From the first 
stages of forfeiture actions, KSASFA “permit[s] massive government 
overreach, [by] letting the government permanently take the property of 
private citizens based only on their vague suspicions.”221  The problem 
stems directly from the language that allows forfeiture “whether or not 
there is a prosecution or conviction related to the offense.”222  The 
language effectively provides a loophole that allows the government to 
forfeit property that it would otherwise be unable to if it was forced to 
prove the criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt.223  The fact that the 
government can still deprive an owner of property even when they cannot 
prove criminal conduct makes civil asset forfeiture an attractive 
consolation prize for the government to at least get something from 
purported criminal activity.224 
KSASFA provides other provisions that favor the government and put 
the owner at a disadvantage.  One such example is the blatant unfairness 
                                                        
 221.   Smith, supra note 4. 
 222.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4104 (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
 223.   See Stuteville, supra note 18, at 1182 (discussing the benefit of allowing government to get 
property when they do not know who would or could be charged, the person is on the run, or the person 
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 224.   See van den Berg, supra note 45, at 895. 
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of §§ 60-4112(o) and (g).225  Section 60-4112(o) states that an acquittal or 
dismissal in criminal proceedings will not preclude proceedings under the 
civil forfeiture act and that it will not “give rise to any presumption adverse 
or contrary to any fact alleged by the seizing agency.”226  On the other 
hand, § 60-4112(g) states that if there is a criminal proceeding, an owner 
is precluded from denying the essential allegations of the offense for which 
he is convicted.227  These two provisions read together preclude the owner 
from asserting collateral estoppel in a forfeiture case based on a favorable 
outcome for the owner in a prior criminal proceeding but hold collateral 
estoppel applicable against the owner if the criminal proceeding resulted 
in a conviction.228 
Through §§ 60-4112(o) and (g),229 the government is given a second 
chance to punish an owner when the owner escapes criminal liability and, 
in the alternative, it allows the government to use the owner’s conviction 
against him.  Such unfairness would be moot if a conviction was required 
because then collateral estoppel could only apply in the case of a 
conviction, and a forfeiture would not proceed if the criminal proceeding 
resulted in an acquittal or dismissal.  The Kansas Legislature, through the 
drafting of KSASFA, explicitly gives the government the edge and 
precludes the owner from using any favorable advantage he may have.  
This is an abuse of power that gives the government an advantage in 
forfeiture actions at the owners’ expense. 
Even when KSASFA’s words do not clearly create an advantage for 
the government, the courts’ interpretation of KSASFA gives the 
government an advantage.  One example of KSASFA’s poor construction 
and judicial interpretation leading to governmental overreach can be seen 
in § 60-4115(a), which allows for the seizure and forfeiture of  property in 
place of other forfeitable property.230  The Kansas Court of Appeals 
explained “[b]y its very nature, substituted property under [K.S.A. §] 60-
4115(a) is otherwise nonforfeitable property taken in place of forfeitable 
property.”231  In other words, if the government cannot seize property that 
would otherwise be eligible for forfeiture, such as the homestead232 or if 
                                                        
 225.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4112(o), (g) (2005 & Supp. 2017). 
 226.   Id. § 60-4112(o). 
 227.   Id. § 60-4112(g). 
 228.   State I-135/I-70 Drug Task Force v. 1990 Lincoln Town Car, 145 P.3d 921, 927–28 (Kan. 
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 231.   State ex rel. Riley Cty. Police Dep’t v. $1,489.00 U.S. Currency, 59 P.3d 1045, 1049 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2002). 
 232.   Id. at 1047, 1049. 
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the property is missing,233 then the government can pick any other 
property, comparable in value, and take that regardless of its relation to 
the underlying criminal activity. 
For example, in State ex rel. Riley County Police Department v. 
$1,489.00 United States Currency, the Kansas Court of Appeals permitted 
a night vision scope and $1,489.00 cash found in the defendant’s pocket 
to be forfeited in lieu of the defendant’s house, even though neither the 
scope nor the cash was connected to criminal activity.234  The aggregate 
effect of such an expansive provision is that once criminal activity is 
suspected, the government can take any property it wants regardless of its 
connection to the criminal activity that provided the basis for forfeiture.  
Allowing for the forfeiture of substitute property also undermines the 
“legal fiction” civil forfeiture is based on because the property that 
“committed” the wrong is not actually being taken.  This is too broad a 
provision that allows the government to reach any property regardless of 
its actual connection to criminal activity. 
Another example of judicial interpretation expanding KSASFA’s 
reach can be seen in the Kansas Court of Appeals’ interpretation of certain 
time limits in favor of the government.  One example of a time limit that 
the court construed in the government’s favor is found in K.S.A. § 60-
4109(a)(1): 
If 90 days pass after the seizure of the property, and the State fails to file 
a notice of pending forfeiture and an owner or interest holder requests 
the property’s release, that owner or interest holder may receive the 
property and hold it as custodian for the court, pending further 
proceedings under the [KSASFA].235 
In this case, the district court released the property in question back to the 
owner because the government’s failure to act within the ninety days 
stripped the court of continued jurisdiction over the property.236  The 
Kansas Court of Appeals found that this was an incorrect interpretation of 
the provision because of its “pending further proceedings” language.237  
The court found that even if property is released, it is still subject to further 
proceedings and within the court’s jurisdiction for the five-year statute of 
                                                        
 233.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4115(a)(1). 
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limitations allowed under KSASFA.238  The wording, as interpreted by the 
Kansas Court of Appeals, makes the ninety-day limit requiring the 
government to file a notice of forfeiture virtually meaningless unless the 
owner has filed for release of the property.  It is unclear why the owner 
must assert his rights to the property before the government must comply 
with statutorily mandated time limits. 
The Kansas Court of Appeals also interpreted § 60-4113(g) as a loose 
time requirement stating that “the hearing on the claim shall be held within 
60 days after service of the petition,” which is discretionary, not 
mandatory.239  The court cited that this timeline was discretionary because 
the hearing is a matter of convenience and no injury can result from it.240  
Finding that the time for a hearing is discretionary is a complete disregard 
for the process of forfeitures and also seems to circumvent any due process 
for the individual property owner.  There is injury to the owner because he 
is improperly deprived of his property when the courts allow the seizing 
party to hold that property even longer than the statute’s text allows. 
In the same opinion, the court explained that a mandatory provision 
would be one in which “the legislature intended a compliance with such 
provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when 
some antecedent and prerequisite conditions must exist prior to the 
exercise of power or must be performed before certain other powers can 
be exercised.”241  The point of the provision is to require disposition of the 
property in a timely manner.  As such, the owner’s right to regain control 
of his property depends on the hearing, which could easily fit the definition 
of a mandatory provision.  Stripping away mandatory measures is a 
relaxation of the already relaxed forfeiture laws and only hurts property 
owners. 
In contrast, the Kansas Court of Appeals has not extended the same 
relaxed interpretation of KSASFA’s wording to owners.  Section 60-
4111(b) discusses the form that an owner’s response to forfeiture must take 
and outlines seven pieces of information to be included.242  The court, 
using the same distinction of mandatory versus discretionary provisions, 
determined that the seven requirements in this provision are mandatory 
because it involves substance.243  That means that while the government 
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does not have to timely file its notice of forfeiture or even timely set and 
conduct a hearing, a property owner is required to strictly comply with 
these requirements.  If the property owner fails to do so, then he is deprived 
of standing to contest the seizure, and his property is forfeited.244  This 
inherent tendency to strictly enforce the language of the statute against the 
owner but to interpret it looser in favor of the government gives the 
government the clear advantage. 
KSASFA provisions allow for massive governmental abuse and 
overreach at the expense of Kansas property owners.  First, KSASFA 
provides financial incentives that encourage aggressive and extensive 
forfeiture.  Second, the Kansas Legislature provides no effective oversight 
or enforcement of the statutory reporting requirements.  Third, KSASFA, 
in substance and interpretation, favors the government in forfeiture 
actions.  These abuses are further exacerbated by the Kansas property 
owner’s inability to exercise his due process rights to protect his property 
from the government. 
2. Reducing Governmental Abuse and Overreach 
To eliminate the pervasive potential for governmental abuse and 
overreach, the Kansas Legislature must make changes to KSASFA.  As 
mentioned previously, adopting a criminal forfeiture approach will ensure 
that the property owner can exercise his constitutional protections that are 
inapplicable in a civil forfeiture.  Such a change would also remove the 
burden from the owner and place it on the government.  While adopting a 
criminal forfeiture approach would give the property owner some 
protection from the government in forfeiture actions, these protections do 
not remedy the potentials for governmental abuse and overreach caused 
by KSASFA’s financial incentives and government favoritism. 
To address the financial incentive, the Kansas Legislature must 
completely overhaul K.S.A § 60-4117, even the amendments implemented 
by House Bill 2459 do not go far enough.  The Kansas Legislature, first 
and foremost, must change who benefits from forfeitures.  There are many 
options of where to put the forfeiture proceeds.  For instance, Missouri 
requires the funding to go to schools,245 and New Mexico places the money 
in the state’s general fund.246  Taking the financial benefits of forfeiture 
away from law enforcement will ensure that policing for profit concerns 
are eliminated from Kansas’ forfeiture approach. 
                                                        
 244.   Id. 
 245.   MO. CONST. Art. IX, § 7; MO. REV. STAT. § 513.623 (West 2002). 
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Making such a change, however, will not occur without some 
pushback.  A legislative liaison for the Kansas Association of Chiefs of 
Police argues that “[w]ithout these funds going back to the [law 
enforcement] agency the activity funded would either require additional 
tax dollars or the loss of investigative ability.”247  However, this argument 
is flawed and moot in a criminal forfeiture system.  In a criminal forfeiture 
system, the investigation into criminal charges and the forfeiture of 
property would be one transaction which would, in theory, save 
investigative costs.  Further, if effectuating forfeitures is such an expense 
on the law enforcement budget, perhaps forfeitures should not be a 
priority.  Until law enforcement is not given the benefit of forfeiture funds, 
Kansas will continue to have a policing for profit structure which 
encourages law enforcement to seizure property. 
The Kansas Legislature also needs to reform the reporting 
requirements.  First, the legislature needs to implement enumerated 
penalties for agencies that do not comply with reporting requirements.  
Second, the Kansas Legislature should consider appointing a neutral body 
to oversee forfeitures instead of giving that power to one of the agencies 
that is also effectuating forfeitures itself. Third, KSASFA must adopt 
centralized reporting and publication.  House Bill 2459 states that KBI 
must create a website in connection with the Kansas asset seizure and 
forfeiture repository.248  However, it is unclear if this means that forfeiture 
reports will be publicly reported on that website.  House Bill 2459 also 
introduced a new section that states each agency is charged with adopting 
its own procedure for providing public access to the records.249  This 
approach still appears decentralized and disjointed.  Requiring centralized 
reporting and publication will allow for a comprehensive picture of 
forfeitures in Kansas and provide public accountability.  Other states, 
including New Mexico and Missouri, implemented centralized, online 
forfeiture reporting.250 
Finally, the Kansas Legislature needs to reevaluate its clear favoritism 
for the government in forfeiture proceedings.  Some of this favoritism will 
be resolved by adopting a criminal forfeiture approach because the burden 
will be on the government and it will be substantial.  However, the Kansas 
Legislature must decide whether time limits in forfeiture proceeds are 
discretionary or mandatory and the effect of either choice should be 
applied equally to both parties.  KSASFA currently allows too much 
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potential for governmental abuse and overreach due to its construction, 
interpretation, and action in practice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Kansas, through KSASFA, earned its place among the worst forfeiture 
laws in the nation.  The Kansas Legislature must reform KSASFA from a 
civil forfeiture system to a criminal forfeiture system to better effectuate 
its purpose, protect individuals’ property rights, and curb governmental 
overreach and abuse.  Civil forfeiture and its “legal fiction” have no place 
in our justice system and after such expansive use, it must be laid to rest.  
Other states are starting to take this approach or are at least providing more 
protections to property owners to address some of the problems created by 
civil forfeiture. 
Allowing forfeiture of an individual’s property without requiring a 
conviction allows for massive governmental overreach and violates the 
American ideals regarding property rights and due process of law.  Modern 
day civil forfeiture, expanded by the government from its limited form in 
English law, now seems to resemble the deodand forfeiture that was not 
adopted into American law.251  Civil forfeiture is a source of revenue for 
law enforcement and the government based on the idea that if property is 
connected to crime, then a person does not deserve to keep it. This mirrors 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s description of English deodands: “the deodand 
became a source of Crown revenue, the institution was justified as a 
penalty for carelessness.”252  America should reject civil forfeiture because 
in its current form, it mirrors forfeiture systems not originally adopted into 
American law. 
While Kansas recently took action to reform KSASFA, the 
amendments do not go far enough.  The amendments addressed law 
enforcement’s use of forfeiture funds, implemented additional reporting 
requirements, and tasked the KBI with creating a forfeiture repository.253  
However, these provisions may, as a practical matter, not be that much of 
a change from KSASFA’s previous form. Most importantly, House Bill 
2459 does not address the main problem with KSASFA: it still allows the 
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government to seize Kansas property owners’ property without ever 
securing a conviction or even filing charges.254  If Kansas continues to 
avoid addressing the real problem of civil forfeiture by passing bills that 
only facially address ancillary problems, such as reporting requirements, 
then Kansas’ forfeiture system will rightfully continue to be regarded as 
among the worst in the nation. 
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